## Cap k

#### Single-issue campaigns like the affirmative are nothing more than masking reforms that sustain the system. The only escape from capitalism is its total destruction, anything less only serves to promote it

Herod, 2006 (James, political activist, Columbia graduate, "Strategies that have failed"<http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/05.htm)>

10. Single-issue campaigns. We cannot destroy capitalism with single-issue campaigns. Yet the great bulk of the energies of radicals is spent on these campaigns. There are dozens of them: campaigns to preserve the forests, keep rent control, stop whaling, stop animal experiments, defend abortion rights, stop toxic dumping, stop the killing of baby seals, stop nuclear testing, stop smoking, stop pornography, stop drug testing, stop drugs, stop the war on drugs, stop police brutality, stop union busting, stop red-lining, stop the death penalty, stop racism, stop sexism, stop child abuse, stop the re-emerging slave trade, stop the bombing of Yugoslavia, stop the logging of redwoods, stop the spread of advertising, stop the patenting of genes, stop the trapping and killing of animals for furs, stop irradiated meat, stop genetically modified foods, stop human cloning, stop the death squads in Colombia, stop the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, stop the extermination of species, stop corporations from buying politicians, stop high stakes educational testing, stop the bovine growth hormone from being used on milk cows, stop micro radio from being banned, stop global warming, stop the militarization of space, stop the killing of the oceans, and on and on. What we are doing is spending our lives trying to fix up a system which generates evils far faster than we can ever eradicate them.¶ Although some of these campaigns use direct action (e.g., spikes in the trees to stop the chain saws or Greenpeace boats in front of the whaling ships to block the harpoons), for the most part the campaigns are directed at passing legislation in Congress to correct the problem. Unfortunately, reforms that are won in one decade, after endless agitation, can be easily wiped off the books the following decade, after the protesters have gone home, or after a new administration comes to power.¶ These struggles all have value and are needed. Could anyone think that the campaigns against global warming, or to free Leonard Peltier, or to aid the East Timorese ought to be abandoned? Single issue campaigns keep us aware of what's wrong, and sometimes even win. But in and of themselves, they cannot destroy capitalism, and thus cannot really fix things. It is utopian to believe that we can reform capitalism. Most of these evils can only be eradicated for good if we destroy capitalism itself and create a new civilization. We cannot afford to aim for anything less.

State

#### THE STATE AND CAPITAL MOVE HAND IN GLOVE—ONE CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT THE OTHER. ONLY A TOTAL DISTANCE FROM THE MODERN STATE CAN ALLOW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CAPITAL. OTHERWISE WHAT IS PUSHED OUT THE DOOR ONLY COMES BACK IN THROUGH THE WINDOW\*\*

Meszaros 95

[Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition]P. 65

The modern state as the comprehensive political command structure of capital — is both the necessary prerequisite for the transformation of capital’s at first fragmented units into a viable system, and the overall framework for the full articulation and maintenance of the latter as a global system. In this fundamental sense the state on account of its constitutive and permanently sustaining role must be understood as an integral part of capital’s material ground itself. Or it contributes in a substantive way not only to the formation and consolidation of all of the major reproductive structures of society but also to their continued functioning. However, the close interrelationship holds also when viewed from the other side. For the modern state itself is quite inconceivable without capital as its social metabolic foundation. This makes the material reproductive structures of the capital system the necessary condition not only for the original constitution but also for the continued survival (and appropriate historical transformations) of the modern state in all its dimensions. These reproductive structures extend their Impact over everything, from the strictly material/repressive instruments cid juridical institutions of the state all the way to the most mediated ideological and political theorizations of its raison d’être and claimed legitimacy. It is on account of this reciprocal determination that we must speak of a close match between the social metabolic ground of the capital system on the one hand, and the modern state as the totalizing political command structure of the established productive and reproductive order on the other. For socialists this is a most uncomfortable and challenging reciprocity. It puts into relief the sobering fact that any intervention in the political domain — even when it envisages the radical overthrow of the capitalist state — can have only a very limited impact in the realization of the socialist project. And the other way round, the corollary of the same sobering fact is that, precisely because socialists have to confront the power of capital’s self-sustaining reciprocity under its fundamental dimensions, it should be never forgotten or ignored - although the tragedy of seventy years (if Soviet experience is that it had been willfully ignored — that there can be no chance of overcoming the power of capital without remaining faithful to the Marxian concern with the ‘withering away’ of the state.

SARKAR (Green Party) ‘99   
[Sara Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism: A Critical Analysis of Humanity’s Fundamental Choices.]

#### With the paradigm shift propounded in chapter 1, one aspect of the critique of capitalism has undergone a fundamental change. The critique is no longer that capitalism ultimately fetters the forces of production, on the contrary, the critique today is that it has developed and is developing them so much that they cause massive degradation of the natural basis of many forms of life including human life. Because of this change the traditional leftist critique of capitalism has indeed become obsolete, but not fully. Capitalism continues to degrade humans physically and psychologically, tends to reduce them to mere money making machines. Its very logic fetters the higher potential of people and society—potential that does not generate profit. Its basic principles—self-interest, greed, and competition—promote criminality. For this reason, and to this extent, the leftist critique of capitalism remains valid and relevant. It is also highly relevant to the task of transformation cannot take place, as even many protagonists of eco-capitalism concede, without an ethical approach, without the readiness to sacrifice self-interest. But degraded humans are not capable of this ethical approach and this sacrifice, as is evident from the obstructive reactions of the majority of citizens of industrial societies to the challenge of this transformation.

#### The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear war- the only way to stop this is through the coming revolution- turns case

Foster 5 John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.”¶ The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue.¶ The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China, that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism.¶ The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### Our alternative is to SAY NO to the affirmative as a way of refusing complicity with capitalism – our scream against the control of the system is a starting point for movements against capital-

Holloway 2

(John, Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Edinburgh, Social Science Professor at Univ. of Puebla, “Change the World Without Taking Power,” <http://libcom.org/library/change-world-without-taking-power-john-holloway>, VR)

In the beginning is the scream. We scream. When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word, but the scream. Faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a scream of refusal: NO. The starting point of theoretical reflection is opposition, negativity, struggle. It is from rage that thought is born, not from the pose of reason, not from the reasoned-sitting-back-and-reflecting-on-the-mysteries-of-existence that is the conventional image of the thinker. We start from negation, from dissonance. The dissonance can take many shapes. An inarticulate mumble of discontent, tears of frustration, a scream of rage, a confident roar. An unease, a confusion, a longing, a critical vibration. Our dissonance comes from our experience, but that experience varies. Sometimes it is the direct experience of exploitation in the factory, or of oppression in the home, of stress in the office, of hunger and poverty, or of state violence or discrimination. Sometimes it is the less direct experience through television, newspapers or books that moves us to rage. Millions of children live on the streets of the world. In some cities, street children are systematically murdered as the only way of enforcing respect for private property. In 1998 the assets of the 200 richest people were more than the total income of 41% of the world's people (two and a half billion). In 1960, the countries with the wealthiest fifth of the world's people had per capita incomes 30 times that of the poorest fifth: by 1990 the ratio had doubled to 60 to one, and by 1995 it stood at 74 to one. The stock market rises every time there is an increase in unemployment. Students are imprisoned for struggling for free education while those who are actively responsible for the misery of millions are heaped with honours and given titles of distinction, General, Secretary of Defence, President. The list goes on and on. It is impossible to read a newspaper without feeling rage, without feeling pain. Dimly perhaps, we feel that these things that anger us are not isolated phenomena, that there is a connection between them, that they are all part of a world that is flawed, a world that is wrong in some fundamental way. We see more and more people begging on the street while the stock markets break new records and company directors' salaries rise to ever dizzier heights, and we feel that the wrongs of the world are not chance injustices but part of a system that is profoundly wrong. Even Hollywood films (surprisingly, perhaps) almost always start from the portrayal of a fundamentally unjust worldbefore going on to reassure us (less surprisingly) that justice for the individual can be won through individual effort. Our anger is directed not just against particular happenings but is against a more general wrongness, a feeling that the world is askew, that the world is in some way untrue. When we experience something particularly horrific, we hold up our hands in horror and say 'that cannot be! it cannot be true!' We know that it is true, but feel that it is the truth of an untrue world. What would a true world look like? We may have a vague idea: it would be a world of justice, a world in which people could relate to each other as people and not as things, a world in which people would shape their own lives. But we do not need to have a picture of what a true world would be like in order to feel that there is something radically wrong with the world that exists. Feeling that the world is wrong does not necessarily mean that we have a picture of a utopia to put in its place. Nor does it necessarily mean a romantic, some-day-my-prince-will-come idea that, although things are wrong now, one day we shall come to a true world, a promised land, a happy ending. We need no promise of a happy ending to justify our rejection of a world we feel to be wrong. That is our starting point: rejection of a world that we feel to be wrong, negation of a world we feel to be negative. This is what we must cling to.

## T

**Interpretation – restriction requires prohibition of an authority**

**Restriction means prohibition**

**Corpus Juris Secundum 31**  
Volume 54, p. 735  
RESTRICT:  To confine; to limit; to prevent (a person or thing) from passing a certain limit in any kind of action; to restrain; to restrain without bounds.

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**Bidirectionality – absent a prohibition, the aff can create meaningless "conditions" that EXPAND presidential power – commission consultation proves**

**Wilson Center No Date**  
(War Powers Proposal Gives the President Even More Authority,<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/war-powers-proposal-gives-the-president-even-more-authority)>

A privately organized Commission on War Powers recommended last week that the 1973 War Powers Resolution be repealed and replaced by a Congressional Joint Committee on Consultation and new procedures to approve or disapprove a "significant armed conflict."¶ The 12-member, bipartisan commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and James Baker, said the current law is flawed. In fact, every president since Richard Nixon has refused to comply with the War Powers Resolution on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the president's powers as commander in chief. Among other things, the current act authorizes Congress to terminate combat operations by adopting a concurrent resolution. The Supreme Court ruled in the 1983 Chadha immigration case that one-house and two-house legislative vetoes do not conform to the Constitution's lawmaking requirements of two-house passage and presentment to the president. ¶ Under the substitute law proposed by the commission, the president must, prior to committing troops to "a significant armed conflict" (one likely to last more than a week), submit a classified report to the new joint committee justifying the need for action. The president is then required to consult at least once every 60 days with the committee. ¶ Within 30 days after the conflict begins, if Congress has not enacted a declaration of war or a law authorizing the use of force, a privileged concurrent resolution approving the troop commitment must be brought to a vote in both chambers. If either chamber rejects the approval resolution, any Member can then offer a privileged joint resolution disapproving the commitment. If the joint resolution is vetoed by the president, a two-thirds override vote by both chambers would be necessary to terminate the commitment. ¶ If I were either of the current presidential candidates, I would endorse the commission proposal in a heartbeat. It proposes to vastly expand presidential powers and options beyond current practice. In the "use of force" joint resolutions for Iraq (1991 and 2002) and Afghanistan (2001), Congress was able to negotiate conditions and limitations on the use of force with the president, who then signed the resolutions into law. ¶ That will not be the case if Congress uses the concurrent resolution of approval approach. No matter how many conditions Congress might try to place on the president's use of force in such a concurrent resolution, the president would be under no legal obligation to comply because the provisions would have no force or effect outside Congress. This is because concurrent resolutions are mere sense-of-Congress expressions. (Who's going to charge the president with failing to faithfully execute a non-law?) ¶ It stands to reason that, given this option, no future president will ask for a declaration of war or use of force law when the alternative is a nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolution approving the commitment of troops to combat. Never mind that such a resolution is probably unconstitutional under the Chadha decision requiring two-house passage and presentment to the president. (It's unlikely the court would directly rule on the issue since in recent times it has sidestepped war powers disputes between the branches on the grounds that they present political questions best left to the president and Congress to resolve.) ¶ Another clear advantage to the president presented by the commission's proposed law is the unique relationship that would be established with the 20-member, bipartisan joint committee. Its members would include the Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, House and Senate Minority Leaders and the chairmen and ranking members of eight key committees. Whereas the administration must currently answer to several committees for its war policies, often in public hearings, the new arrangement will give the president both the incentive and justification to deal exclusively with the joint committee in closed sessions. This is something administrations have wanted for years given the burden of officials delivering duplicative testimony in open forums before multiple committees and subcommittees. ¶ The real losers in this new arrangement, of course, will be the rest of the House and Senate and the American people, all of whom will be left in the dark about what is said and done in the closed-door committee consultations with the president. They will be left to trust the judgment of committee members on the necessity for war and its subsequent conduct. ¶ The Commission on War Powers understandably reflects the leadership and views of two former secretaries of State who no doubt see Congress as many of their predecessors have: as an ill-informed, noisy, quarrelsome and meddling micro-manager when it comes to deciding the great issues of war and peace. If the administration must accommodate Congress in some way before making such decisions, they reason, it is best done among a few power elites in Congress, behind closed doors and shielded by classified briefings and documents.

**Violation: they don’t prohibit the introduction of troops into hostilities, just put a conditoin on it.**

**Standards:**

1. **Limits-we fairly limit the topic, having the neg prepare for prohibit while letting the aff define what to prohibit**
2. **Clear brightline- prohibition allows for a clear interpretation of what is topical and what isn’t**
3. **Topic Education- we learn about the entirety of laws and the spirit of them instead of getting rid of a small part of them**

## Case

## Offshore balancing

**Offshore balancing kills hegemony**

**Layne and Thayer, ’07** (Christopher, international theorist and the Robert M. Gates Chain in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M University, Andrew, professor of political science at Baylor University, “American empire: a debate”, Psychology Press, <http://books.google.com/books?id=YgE-1HjR70sC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>, LH)

Layne does not illuminate the risks associated with his preferred grand strategy of offshore balancing principally because those risks far outweigh any gain. Abandoning primacy in favor of offshore balancing would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Most importantly, it would cause the United States to abandon its dominant position in favor of inferiority for the first time in a century. Offshore balancing is a radical break with American tradition, statecrafi, and policies which have allowed the United States first, to defeat four peer competitors-Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Cold War; second, by peaceful means, to replace the previously dominant state- Great Britain; and third, to win greater security for the American people and their allies.

**Primacy Better**

**Primacy is comparatively superior to off-shore balancing—Layne's grand strategy would prompt global conflict.**

**Thayer 7** [Bradley, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, "Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 116-117]

Primacy Is the Right Grand Strategy for the United States There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy. Primacy is the best and most effective means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic “alternative” is a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United States and for other countries. A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United [end page 116] States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and Turkey.

**The risks of off-shore balancing outweigh the benefits – primacy is key.**

**Thayer 7** [Bradley, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, "Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 103-104 ]

To advance these goals, in this chapter I would like to respond to Layne’s criticisms of the grand strategy of primacy made in chapter 2 and present some final reflections on the grand strategy of offshore balancing versus the grand strategy of primacy. I argue that primacy is the superior grand strategic choice for the United States because it provides the greatest benefit for the United States with the least risk. Furthermore, to abandon the grand strategy of primacy at this time would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Why Layne’s Critique of American Primacy Is Wrong Layne levels several major allegations against the grand strategy of Primacy, and I want to respond to the two most important: first, that the pursuit of primacy makes the United States less secure; second, that Iraq serves as a test case for the American Empire, and—he submits—it is a test that the United States is failing. Before I reply, I would like to thank Layne for illuminating the risks associated with primacy. Although both of his charges are wrong—in fact, the pursuit of hegemony makes the United States more secure and Iraq reflects some of the best principles of the United States—having Layne present the case against the American Empire helps to advance this vital debate. Layne does not illuminate the risks associated with his preferred grand strategy of offshore balancing principally because those risks far outweigh any gain. Abandoning primacy in favor of offshore balancing would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Most importantly, it would cause the United States to abandon its dominant position in favor of inferiority for the first time in a century. Offshore balancing is a radical break with American tradition, statecraft, and policies which have allowed the United States first, to defeat four peer competitors—Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union in World War II and the Cold War; second, by peaceful means, to replace the previously dominant state—Great Britain; and third, to win greater security for the American people and their allies.

**The fact that hegemony will one day end is not a reason to accelerate its decline – Layne is wrong about the sustainability and desirability of primacy.**

**Thayer 7** [Bradley, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, "Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 104]

Each country knows it will never be perfectly secure, but that does not detract from the necessity of seeking security. International politics is a dangerous environment in which countries have no choice but to participate. Any involvement—from the extensive involvement of the United States to the narrow activity of Switzerland—in this dangerous realm runs the risk of a backlash. That is simply a fact of life in international politics. The issue is how much participation is right. Thankfully, thus far the United States recognizes it is much better to be involved so that it may shape events, rather than to remain passive, having events shaped by other countries, and then adjusting to what they desire. In contrast to Layne’s argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to **dissuade states from challenging it**. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.

Primacy is key to U.S. and global security – off-shore balancing would collapse the world order.

**Thayer 7** [Bradley, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, "Reply to Christopher Layne: The Strength of the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 105-106]

Second, U.S. power protects the United States. That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as one can make. International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no “time outs,” there [end page 105] is no halftime and no rest. It never stops. There is no hiding from threats and dangers in international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. Simply by declaring that the United States is going home, thus abandoning its commitments or making half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat. In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true in the anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its interests, other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself.

## Bases

**Key**

**Research on offshore balancing is flawed – ground troops are needed for political objectives**

Schake 10 **(Kori, PhD in government, researcher at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, “Limits of offshore balancing,” October 13, 2010,** [**http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits\_of\_offshore\_balancing**](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits_of_offshore_balancing)**, YS)**

**Pape's research shows that the majority of suicide bomb attacks occur in places occupied by U.S. military forces; from this he concludes that we should adopt a strategy of "offshore balancing." By which he means to remove U.S. forces and rely on military strikes into the countries, along with more effective political and economic engagement. Neither the research nor the prescriptions are sound bases for policy. To say that attacks occur where U.S. forces are deployed is to say no more than Willy Sutton, who robbed banks because "that's where the money is." Pape's approach ignores the context in which deployment and stationing of U.S. forces occurs. We send troops to advance our interests, protect our allies, and contest the political and geographic space that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban are operating in. Of course the attacks will stop if we cede those political objectives. But the troops are not the point, the political objectives are the point. The second important context Pape glosses over is that suicide attacks do not occur wherever in the world U.S. troops are deployed. Troops stationed in Germany, Japan, or South Korea are not at risk of suicide attacks from the people of those countries. This is not just about U.S. troops, but also about the societies we are operating in. It is about a radical and violent interpretation of Islam that we are using military force to contest. The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most durable. That was the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces. An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our objectives. We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive ways.**

**Bases Solve Terrorism**

Heg Solves Terrorism – war on terror proves

**Benard 8** [Alexander, Formerly of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy “An Unexpected Bright Spot” National Review Online October 27, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YmEyNzYxNDk2N2Q1OWQ4OTk1YTcxNjVkYjQ2MDJlMWE=]

Amidst the many worrisome trends the next president will face when he assumes office in January, he will be able to take comfort in at least one major bright spot: The strategic landscape in the Middle East will be more favorable to the United States than at any point in recent history. Throughout the Cold War, every U.S. president encountered a Middle East mired in conflict and largely hostile to U.S. interests. Many countries in the region — including Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen — were aligned with the Soviet Union. Those that were not often chose to focus singularly on the military defeat of Israel. Jordan, for example, sent troops to Syria so that they could participate in the October 1973 attack against Israel, and all the Gulf States — Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — punished the United States for its support of Israel by coordinating the 1970s oil embargo that crippled our economy. Other major conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war that lasted almost throughout the entire 1980s and the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan that same decade, created very difficult policy dilemmas for the United States. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and other factors, the region remained volatile and dangerous to U.S. national security throughout the 1990s. Indeed, in 2001, at the time of George W. Bush’s inauguration, a second Intifada was underway after failed peace talks between Israel and Palestine; Afghanistan was a terrorist sanctuary; Iraq was under the leadership of a violent, anti-American dictator; Iran had begun developing nuclear weapons; Libya was a state-sponsor of terrorism; Saudi Arabia was funding radical madrassas throughout the Middle East and using hate-mongering textbooks in its own schools; and Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. were at best unclear, given the 1999 military coup and the country’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But today, the strategic landscape is shockingly and fundamentally different. Only two countries — Iran and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Syria — remain hostile to U.S. interests. Another two — Libya, which in a major victory for the Bush administration decided in 2003 to renounce terrorism and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and Lebanon, which for domestic reasons does not currently speak with one clear voice — are pursuing what can be described as foreign policies that are neutral to U.S. interests. Remarkably, all remaining sixteen countries in the region are U.S. allies. These alliances are more than cosmetic and have several important ramifications, starting with our force posture in the region. The United States now has troops and other naval, air, and ground assets in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. This will allow the next president to respond rapidly to threats that develop in the region, whether from terrorist networks or nation-states. Indeed, Iran will not be able to pursue any course of action without first considering whether it would provoke retribution from U.S. troops in the region, including the nearly 200,000 troops stationed along Iranian borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, two new U.S. allies. With the already noted exceptions of Iran and Syria, the entire Middle East is now taking concrete steps to fight terrorism generally and al-Qaeda specifically. Our allies throughout the region are training and equipping their security forces to better handle counterterrorism missions. They are providing the United States with valuable intelligence and they are helping to disrupt terrorist finances. As important, popular support for al Qaeda is declining along with al-Qaeda’s recruitment figures, no doubt in part because of al-Qaeda-in-Iraq’s indiscriminate brutality towards Muslim civilians in Iraq and because of the U.S. military’s success in defeating al-Qaeda-in-Iraq — nobody wants to join a losing team. As for Iran, our allies in the Middle East are now in full agreement with the United States that Iran poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Foreign ministers from Amman to Abu Dhabi to Riyadh are eager to aggressively confront Iran, and are in the process of signing arms agreements with the United States for exactly that purpose. To be sure, the threat of a nuclear Iran is very real and is certainly disconcerting, but for once the U.S. warnings of that threat are not falling on deaf ears, and the United States will not have to meet the threat alone. The Middle East has always posed challenges to the United States, and the same will be true in January 2009. The next president will need to deal with Iran and Syria. He will need to ensure that our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan are not reversed. He will need to continue strengthening our alliances throughout the region, help set Lebanon on the right track, and work towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But what is unique today is that the next president will be able to confront these challenges in the context of an extremely favorable strategic environment.

**\*\*\*Nuclear Terrorism\*\*\***

**Impossible**

**No nuclear terrorism – multiple reasons**

**Reason Foundation 12**

[Reason, May 17 2012, <http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

"Death tugs at my ear and says, 'Live, I am coming.'" Were Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. alive today, he might ascribe that line not to death but to nuclear terrorism. Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands. The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war. Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen

**Terrorists cannot acquire nuclear material – cost, security, and no transportation**

**Mueller 8**

[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Procuring fissile material. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous effort on an industrial scale (Milhollin 2002, 45-46; Allison 2004; Cameron 2004, 83; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material. Although there is legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured (though things have improved considerably), it is under lock and key, and even sleepy, drunken guards, notes Langewiesche, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party. Thieves also need to know exactly what they want and where it is, and this presumably means trusting bribed, but not necessarily dependable, insiders. And to even begin to pull off such a heist, they need to develop a highly nuanced "sense for streets" in foreign lands filled with people who are often congenitally suspicious of strangers (2007, 33-48). Corruption in some areas may provide an opportunity to buy the relevant material, but purchasers of illicit goods and services would have to pay off a host of greedy confederates, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Not only could the exchange prove to be a scam, it could also prove to be part of a sting--or become one. Although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76).10 Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. Once it is noticed that some uranium is missing, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist. Thus even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the sneaky foreign terrorists might well quickly develop second thoughts and go to the authorities. It is also relevant to note that in the last ten years or so, there have been 10 known thefts of highly enriched uranium--in total less than 16 pounds or so, far less than required for an atomic explosion. Most arrestingly, notes Linzer, "the thieves--none of whom was connected to al Qaeda--had no buyers lined up, and nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions" (Linzer 2004; see also Cameron 2004, 83-84; Younger 2007, 87; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 60). Though, of course, there may have been additional thefts that went undiscovered (Bunn and Wier 2006, 137; Tenet and Harlow 2007, 276-77). If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a critical mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces (Langewiesche 2007, 48-50). Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes and, for a considerable fee, opium traders (for example) might provide expert, and possibly even reliable, assistance. But the routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of a handful of criminal and congenitally suspicious and careful regulators (Langewiesche 2007, 54-65). If they became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of these might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money likely to be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Moreover, it is not at all clear that people engaged in the routine, if illegal, business of smuggling would necessarily be so debased that, even for considerable remuneration, they would willingly join a plot that might end up killing tens of thousands of innocent people.11

Can’t detonate

**Mueller 8**

[John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, January 1 2008, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>, accessed on 7/28/12, Kfo]

Transporting and detonating the device. The finished product could weigh a ton or more (Mark et al. 1987, 55, 60; Bunn and Wier 2006, 142). Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant country. This would presumably require trusting it to the tender mercies of the commercial transportation system, supplying a return address, and hoping that the employees and policing agencies, alerted to the dangers by news of the purloined uranium, would remain oblivious. Or the atomic terrorists could try to use established smuggling routes, an approach that, again, would require the completely reliable complicity of a considerable number of criminals. The enormous package would then have to be received by a dedicated and technically-proficient group of collaborators. For this purpose, it would be necessary earlier to have infiltrated such people into the country or else to have organized locals. In a still-secret 2005 report, the FBI allowed as how it had been unable to find a single true al-Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the United States after years of devoted and well-funded sleuthing (Ross 2005), something that apparently continues to be true.18 (In interesting synergy, that would be exactly the number of weapons of mass destruction uncovered by the U.S. military in Iraq over the same period.) They don’t seem to have found any since that time, either. This does not conclusively prove either that there are no such cells in the United States or that al-Qaeda is incapable of infiltrating some in when the need arises, of course. But, while absence of evidence may not be conclusive evidence of absence, it should not be taken to be evidence of existence either. And while it is conceivable that locals could be organized for the destructive enterprise, they would of necessity have to be considerably higher up on brain chain than the ones so far apprehended--higher up, for example, than those who took violent jihadist videos into a store to be duplicated or who schemed to take down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch.19 The IND would then have to be moved over local and unfamiliar roads by this crew to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. And, finally, at the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off its improvised and untested nuclear device, one that, to repeat Allison's description, would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). While doing this they would have to hope, and fervently pray, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there have been no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, doesn't prove to be a dud.

**Nuclear terrorism is science fiction - easier to launch Bin Laden into space. It’s not ironman where you just create high tech weapons in a hideout cave.**

Adam **Garfinkle, 2009** (PhD in international relations, served as a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security), May 2009, Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?", http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html

**There have**, of course, **been** several **novels, dozens of action movies, and** countless television **shows featuring terrorists who had somehow gotten their hands on a nuclear device**. But none of these dramas ever explains credibly how a bunch of ragtag dropouts and narcissists get their hands on or figure out how to build a useable nuclear weapon. This is because they can't. **It is**, to understate the matter, **not an easy thing to build a nuclear weapon, given the physics, metallurgy, and engineering involved**. It takes a fairly large space, a lot of people with different kinds of specialties, and a fair amount of time and money. T**he material involved is not easy to hide or move, and it certainly isn't easy to deliver a bomb to a target** even if one could be fabricated or stolen. Some of the more imaginative depictions of potential catastrophe would have us believe that terrorists could put a nuclear bomb in a suitcase. This is nonsense. You've got to be very sophisticated technically to get a nuke into a suitcase. If you're al Qaeda working in a cave somewhere, even if you have some metallurgy experts and scientists trying to help you, **getting a nuclear device** into a suitcase **is even less likely than being able to launch Osama bin Laden into orbit.**

**No nuclear terror – Terrorists cant acquire, build, or deliver a bomb**

**Chapman 08** Steve Chapman, reporter and editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, 2/8 2008 [RealClearPolitics, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”]

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong

## Imperialism

**Blaming imperialism for all oppression masks more violent forms of oppression – prefer our evidence, its comparative**

Fred **Halliday** (Middle East Report) **1999** “The Middle East at the Millennial Turn” http://www.merip.org/mer/mer213/213\_hallliday.html

Recent developments in the Middle East and the onset of new global trends and uncertainties pose a challenge not only to those who live in the region but also to those who engage it from outside. Here, too, previously-established patterns of thought and commitment are now open to question. The context of the l960s, in which journals such as MERIP Reports (the precursor of this publication) and the Journal of the North American Committee on Latin America (NACLA) were founded, was one of solidarity with the struggles of Third World peoples and opposition to external, imperialist intervention. That agenda remains valid: Gross inequalities of wealth, power and access to rights–a.k.a. imperialism–persist. This agenda has been enhanced by political and ethical developments in subsequent decades. Those who struggle include not only the national groups (Palestinians and Kurds) oppressed by chauvinist regimes and the workers and peasants (remember them?) whose labor sustains these states, but now also includes analyses of gender oppression, press and academic suppression and the denial of ecological security. The agenda has also elaborated a more explicit stress on individual rights in tandem with the defense of collective rights. History itself and the changing intellectual context of the West have, however, challenged this emancipatory agenda in some key respects. On the one hand, oppression, denial of rights and military intervention are not the prerogative of external states alone: An anti-imperialism that cannot recognize–and denounce–indigenous forms of dictatorship and aggression, or that seeks, with varying degrees of exaggeration, to blame all oppression and injustice on imperialism, is deficient. The Iranian Revolution, Ba‘thist Iraq, confessional militias in Lebanon, armed guerrilla groups in a range of countries, not to mention the Taliban in Afghanistan, often represent a much greater immediate threat to human rights and the principles in whose name solidarity was originally formulated than does Western imperialism. Islamist movements from below meet repressive states from above in their conduct. What many people in the region want is not less external involvement but a greater commitment by the outside world, official and non-governmental, to protecting and realizing rights that are universally proclaimed but seldom respected. At the same time, in a congruence between relativist renunciation from the region and critiques of "foundationalist" and Enlightenment thinking in the West, doubt has been cast on the very ethical foundation of solidarity: a belief in universal human rights and the possibility of a solidarity based on such rights. Critical engagement with the region is now often caught between a denunciation of the West's failure actively to pursue the democratic and human rights principles it proclaims and a rejection of the validity of these principles as well as the possibility of any external encouragement of them. This brings the argument back to the critique of Western policy, and of the relation of that critique to the policy process itself. On human rights and democratization, official Washington and its European friends continue to speak in euphemism and evasion. But the issue here is not to see all US involvement as inherently negative, let alone to denounce all international standards of rights as imperialist or ethnocentric, but rather, to hold the US and its European allies accountable to the universal principles they proclaim elsewhere. An anti-imperialism of disengagement serves only to reinforce the hold of authoritarian regimes and oppressive social practices within the Middle East.

**No Impact - Western power and imperialism doesn’t foster violent interventions**

Martin **Shaw** (Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex) April **2001** “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/CGPE/Failed%20States/shaw.pdf

Furthermore, Western leaders have consistently sought to shore up failed and failing (semi-) authoritarian state structures, rather than supporting their break-ups. The West has supported central Russian power throughout all the vicissitudes of the Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin regimes. The West has maintained a 'constructive' relationship with Chinese Communism through Tiananmen Square and all subsequent phases of repression. The eastern advances of NATO and the European Union have responded largely to the demands of local elites and populations - as well as to the fear of further state breakdown in regions close to Western Europe. Even after the West had defeated the Saddam regime in the Gulf War, and even as the latter waged genocidal war on Shi'ites and Kurds, it was reluctant to countenance the break-up of the Iraqi state. Likewise, the West's early response to the Yugoslav crisis was to try to shore up a federal state that was ceasing to exist, condoning the early atrocities of the Yugoslav National Army; after several years of war, it still backed Milosevic's Serbia as a force for stability. Only long after it became clear that the latter was leading to new wars, in Kosovo and (threatened) in Montenegro, did Western leaders move reluctantly to confront Serbia. Thus it was not only in East Timor, where the historically pro-Western Indonesian regime was the oppressor, that the West supported the existing centre and was late in coming to the rescue of the victims of genocide. Generally, therefore, Western power generally supports the maintenance of state structures even where these are dominated by regimes that are anti-Western as well as repressive. More extreme cases of 'state collapse' have tended to occur in countries like Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone that have been of minimal or declining strategic and economic significance. In these cases, even more than in Iraq or Yugoslavia, Western elites have generally been extremely reluctant to intervene. The more credible charge against the West is not that it intervenes widely in support of its own interests, but that: it avoids intervention and tolerates even genocidal repression, where its own interests are not strongly engaged; its interventions are therefore consistently late in responding to state and human crises;Page 18 18 its interventions are often half-baked, appeasing local elites and failing to anticipate events; its national elites are unwilling to risk even small numbers of 'their' soldiers, even when the lives of large numbers of non-Western civilians are at risk; it is disinterested in the strong development of global institutions, preferring ad hoc structures that it can manipulate to genuine global democratic governance. In what sense, then, can contemporary Western power be said to represent an advance on historic European empires and Cold War American power? The above is hardly a positive appraisal. Indeed, the main positive advantages of Western power lie in its internal characteristics (internationalisation and democratisation) rather than in the development of a positive post- imperial relationship with the non-Western world. The principal challenges to empire, authoritarianism and repression come today from civil society and social movements, rather than from the Western state.

**Anti-imperialist strategies distort struggles for real global justice – resorting in massive violence in the periphery of your anti-western struggle**

Martin **Shaw** (Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex) April **2001** “The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/CGPE/Failed%20States/shaw.pdf

It is worth asking how the politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice. John Pilger, for example, consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention against Serbia. He never attempted to minimise the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice. We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western governments take up their cause or not; we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims.

**Not the root cause of conflict – other factors overwhelm**

**Volf 2002** Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02

Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

## Solvency

#### Speed is Key to victory in every domain. We need bases to ensure quick response.

Johson ‘6

Karlton, Army War College, “Temporal and Scalar Mechanics of Conflict Strategic Implications of Speed and Time on the American Way of War,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449394.pdf

Military services appear to be increasingly dependent on speed, and these organizations continue to place a premium on its relative value. The Army’s “Field Manual 1: The Army,” embraces the idea that speed is critical to its operational concept, necessary for maneuver forces to keep the initiative in battle, and vital towards achieving shock and surprise.25 The United States Navy looks to speed as an essential component of maritime operations. In “Fleet Tactics and Costal Combat,” Wayne P. Hughes reasons that speed is necessary to win the sea battle **within the first few shots of an engagement**.26 The United States Air Force has plans to increase the speed and fidelity of command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) to create Predictive Battlespace Awareness over the combat area. The desired end state of these capabilities will be “getting a cursor over a target” upon demand.27 Even U.S. Air Force doctrine is replete with references to speed. The concept of speed clearly underlies the tenets and principles of airpower as an enabling factor.28

#### New statutory restrictions collapse executive crisis response --- triggers terrorism, rogue state attacks, and wildfire prolif

John Yoo 8/30/13, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Like it or not, Constitution allows Obama to strike Syria without Congressional approval,” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/>

The most important of the president’s powers are commander-in-chief and chief executive.¶ As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”¶ Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¶ The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action, sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances, that are best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. ¶ Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. ¶ Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because it had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. ¶ Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.¶ Congress's track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one.¶ Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress's isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict.¶ President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president's foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.¶ Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War, and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the Resolution in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.¶ Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare War.” But these observers read the eighteenth-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare War” to mean “start war.” ¶ When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain – where the Framers got the idea of the declare-war power – fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.¶ Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war, because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process.¶ In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” ¶ This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.¶ Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. ¶ Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans.¶ Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. ¶ Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. ¶ If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military.¶ Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse.¶ If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president's decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually.¶ It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action.¶ Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. ¶ Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.¶ The Framers expected Congress's power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.¶ Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check.¶ We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security.¶ In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility.¶ It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security.¶ Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics.¶ As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.